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CAN PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS INFORM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES? 
 
Abstract 
Understanding behavior in experimental public goods games is fundamental to the work 
of environmental, behavioral, institutional and policy-oriented economists.  Although much 
research has been devoted to explaining the dynamics of such experiments, the conclusions 
drawn to date are contradictory.  Through the use of a novel experimental design, a theoretical 
model of behavior, and appropriate econometric methods, we address weaknesses in the current 
literature and resolve much of the conflicting claims about motives in public goods experiments.  
Our analysis demonstrates that herders and strong reciprocators are the main contributors to the 
public good, whereas the role of interdependent utility and warm-glow altruism is weak at best. 
Further, the oft-observed decay in contributions over rounds is driven by the revocation of 
cooperation by disappointed strong reciprocators coupled with the herding behavior of confused 
subjects. We find no evidence that confused subjects learn the dominant strategy over time. The 
data instead imply that a substantial proportion of subjects do not recognize the tension between 
the privately optimal strategy and the socially optimal strategy. These results offer insights into 
improving environmental policy, but also suggest that public goods experiments cannot achieve 
their full potential as long as the way in which they are implemented in the laboratory leaves 
most subjects unaware of the social dilemma that experimentalists are trying to induce.  
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I.  Introduction 
Much of environmental policy is designed to induce private individuals to contribute the 
public environmental good when it is in their private interests to avoid such contribution.  For 
example, when individuals consume freshwater they typically ignore the environmental impacts 
of removing that water from natural systems (whether or not they are aware of such impacts). 
Efforts to reduce freshwater consumption can thus try to raise the price of water use to reflect the 
environmental values of freshwater in situ, or they can try to encourage social norms that frown 
upon “excessive use” of water (thus generating a private cost to anyone who accepts the norm 
and violates it).  Economists often use laboratory experiments to explore how individuals behave 
under different public goods scenarios and gain insights into how institutions might be better 
designed to encourage the provision of environmental public goods. 
The large and diverse experimental literature on the private provision of public goods is 
based principally on variants of the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) game. In a 
typical linear VCM experiment, subjects are given an endowment of “tokens” to be divided 
between a private account and a public account (Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984). Contributions 
to the public account yield a return to each of the n individuals in the group, regardless of their 
contribution level. If the marginal return from contributing a token to the public account is less 
than the value of a token kept in the private account, but the sum of the marginal returns to the 
group is greater than the value of a token kept, the individually rational contribution is zero (i.e., 
the individual free rides) while the social optimum is realized when everyone contributes their 
entire endowment to the public account. 
In one-shot VCM experiments with a dominant strategy of contributing nothing to the 
public good, subjects contribute at levels far above the theoretically predicted value: on average, 
40-60% of endowments.1 In repeated-round VCM experiments, contributions start in the range of 
40-60% but then decay towards zero (ending around 10% of endowments on average). Although 
the pattern of initially high contributions rates and subsequent decay is generally observed, the 
cause of these dynamics is controversial (Ledyard 1995, p. 148).   
Possible motives underlying contributions include self-interested weak reciprocity 
(“reciprocal altruism”) to promote contributions from other group members, other-regarding 
                                                 
1 We focus on classic linear public good games that (1) use the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism to elicit 
contributions and (2) create a dominant strategy to free ride and a socially optimal strategy to contribute the entire 
endowment.  We believe, however, that the inferences drawn are applicable to other public goods games. 
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preferences such as interdependent utility, warm-glow altruism, and strong reciprocity 
(“conditional cooperation”), and decision error stemming from the failure to identify the 
dominant strategy (“confusion”). The decay in contributions could be a result of learning the 
dominant strategy or a revocation of conditional cooperation. 
Experimental economists have used different approaches to discriminate among these 
explanations. Most approaches rely on clever manipulations of subject payoffs, changes in the 
rules of the VCM game, or using results from other games to make inferences about behavior in 
the VCM game. Unfortunately, the reliance on these methods has resulted in incomplete 
separation of motives and conflicting conclusions about the factors that drive behavior in the 
VCM game (Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Goeree, 
Holt and Laury, 2002; Carpenter, 2004; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2004).  
Understanding behavior in the VCM game is more than an academic curiosity.  The 
VCM game and its variants (e.g. Provision Point Mechanism game) are the workhorses of 
experimental research on the private provision of public goods. Public economists use the VCM 
to test a variety of public economic theories, behavioralists use the VCM to gain insight into the 
nature of individual preferences in collective action situations, and institutionalists and policy-
oriented economists use the VCM to explore how changes in the rules affect collective 
outcomes. Continued use of the VCM game without a clear understanding of what drives subject 
behavior is perilous. In fact, the analysis we present implies that a substantial proportion of 
subjects in VCM experiments do not recognize the tension between the dominant strategy and 
the socially optimal strategy: they are simply confused “herders” that take group contributions as 
an indication of optimal contributions levels (they are erroneously classified as “conditional 
cooperators” in previous studies). Thus, the internal and external validity of the VCM 
experiment for making inferences to real-world phenomenon is questionable unless such 
confused subjects can be identified in an experiment. 
Our analysis improves upon previous work in three important ways: (1) we develop a 
novel experimental design that allows one to better discriminate between contributions stemming 
from other-regarding preferences and those due to confusion, without changing the fundamental 
rules of the VCM game; (2) we develop a behavioral model of individual contributions that 
complements the experimental design; and (3) we apply appropriate econometric methods to 
estimate the unknown parameters of the behavioral model and draw inferences. 
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In the next section, we survey recent research that endeavors to explain behavior in VCM 
experiments. In Section III, we present the experimental design.  In Section IV, we present 
aggregate results. In Section V, we develop a model of individual behavior and present our 
econometric analysis. In Section VI, we discuss the results and present further evidence from a 
post-experiment “focus group” session. We conclude in Section VII. 
 
II.   Previous Experiments 
In this section, we highlight recent articles that capture the on-going debate over the 
relative importance of different behavioral motives in the VCM game.2  Before describing these 
articles, however, we wish to ensure that the vocabulary we use is clear.  
The term “other-regarding behavior” will be used as an umbrella term to characterize 
three motives for contributions in the VCM game:  (1) “inter-dependent utility” (often called 
“pure altruism”), which describes a situation in which an individual’s utility function is a 
function of his own payoff and the payoffs of his group members; (2) “warm-glow” (often called 
“impure altruism”; Andreoni, 1990), which describes a situation in which an individual gains 
utility from the simple act of contributing to a publicly spirited cause; and (3) “strong 
reciprocity,” which is sometimes referred to as “conditional cooperation.” As described by 
Bowles, Fehr and Gintis (2003, p.1-2), “[s]trong reciprocity is a combination of altruistic 
rewarding, which is a predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-abiding behaviors, 
and altruistic punishment, which is a propensity to sanction others for norm violations. Strong 
reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing but gain no individual economic net benefit 
from their acts. Strong reciprocity thus constitutes a powerful incentive for cooperation even in 
non-repeated interactions and when reputation gains are absent because strong reciprocators will 
reward those who cooperate and punish those who defect….Strong reciprocators’ contributions 
are not contingent upon personal reward and their punishing of defectors is based on the other’s 
behavior, not the punisher’s expected net gain from punishing.”3
In contrast, the term “weak reciprocity” refers to acts of reward and punishment only if 
these acts contribute to the individual’s private economic payoff. Such behavior, often called 
                                                 
2 There are many good articles published on the VCM game. Because of space constraints, we limit our review to a 
few articles that summarize well the current debate in the literature. 
3  Other authors have described similar behavior without any special terms.  For example, Andreoni (1995) 
hypothesized that some of the decay in contributions over rounds in the VCM game might stem from frustrated 
subjects who revoke their cooperation when they observe that others are not cooperating. 
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“reciprocal altruism” in the evolutionary biology literature, comprises strategic behavior aimed at 
securing private benefits. We include such behaviors as “reputation building” and “strategic 
donor leadership” under the term weak reciprocity. 
The term “confusion” is an umbrella term to characterize behavior that stems from 
subjects’ inability to discern the nature of the game in which they are playing. Such players are 
unable to discern the dominant strategy in a linear VCM game. We hypothesize that subjects 
become less confused in the VCM game through two types of learning:  (1) “adaptive 
reinforcement,” or “hill climbing,” by which subjects search for the profit-maximizing strategy 
based on information from previous rounds; and (2) “herding,” or “imitation,” by which subjects 
simply behave as they perceive most other individuals behave (i.e., “the trend is your friend”). 
“Herding” refers to an individual’s perceived lack of understanding of a situation and subsequent 
attempt to use information collected and communicated by others as a behavioral compass. 
Andreoni (1995) developed a VCM-like game that fixes the pool of payoffs and pays 
subjects according to their contributions to the public good. The person who contributes the least 
is paid the most from the fixed pool. Thus contributions to the “public good” in this game do not 
increase aggregate benefits, but merely cost the contributor and benefit the other group members. 
Andreoni uses behavior from the ranking games to infer that both other-regarding behavior and 
confusion are both “equally important” motives in the VCM, although the relative importance of 
each motive cannot be precisely identified through the experimental design. 
Houser and Kurzban (2002) continued Andreoni’s work with a clever experimental 
design that includes: (1) a “human condition,” which is the standard VCM game; and (2) a 
“computer condition,” which is similar to a standard VCM game except that each group consists 
of one human player and three non-human computer players and the human players are aware 
they are playing with computers. Each round, the aggregate computer contribution to the public 
good is three-fourths of the average aggregate contribution observed for that round in the human 
condition.  By making the reasonable assumption that other-regarding preferences and confusion 
are present in the human condition, but only confusion is present in the computer condition, 
Houser and Kurzban conclude that confusion accounts for about half of all public good 
contributions in the standard VCM game and that the decay across rounds is almost entirely due 
to reduced confusion, rather than any declines in other-regarding behavior. The studies by 
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Andreoni and by Houser and Kurzban do not allow one to precisely discriminate among different 
kinds of other-regarding preferences or confusion behaviors. 
Since the Houser and Kurzban design is closely related to our own, we wish to focus on 
some aspects of their approach that make interpreting their results difficult.  First, as noted by the 
authors, average contributions in their human condition (n=20 individuals in 5 groups of 4) 
display an unusual pattern: contributions start at about 62% of endowment and only decline to 
51% of endowment by the 10th and final round. With this unusual pattern of decay (contributions 
typically decline much more) and only ten rounds for evaluating behavior, it is possible that their 
results may not readily extend to typical VCM experiments. 
Second, the identification of “confusion” contributions in their design relies on the 
assumption that contributions in a given round are independent of the history of group 
contributions. If they are not, individual subjects are not independent observations and merely 
presenting all computer condition subjects with three-fourths of the average aggregate 
contributions from the human condition thwarts important dynamics. Ashley, Ball and Eckel 
(2003) analyze raw data from previously published VCM experiments and find that the history of 
group contributions matters quite a lot (see also Carpenter 2004).  
Third, and related to the role of the history of contributions, the computer condition 
changes the standard VCM game beyond simply grouping a human with automata. Human 
subjects in the computer condition observe their group members aggregate contribution before 
they make their decision in a round (as opposed to after they make their decision, as in the 
human condition). If the history of contributions affects both confused and other-regarding 
subjects, then such a change in design can also affect the comparability of the two treatments.4
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) developed an alternative experimental design that, when 
combined with a few behavioral assumptions, allows the authors to separate the effects of inter-
dependent utility, warm-glow and confusion. Their design changes the standard VCM game by 
randomly assigning different rates of return from private consumption each round, which enables 
the measurement of individual contribution rates as a function of that player’s investment costs 
(n=64). A key assumption in their analysis is that other-regarding preferences take only the form 
                                                 
4  A similar design developed and applied independently to a single-shot VCM game concluded that about half of 
contributions were a result of confusion (Ferraro et al. 2003), whereas 74% of first-round contributions in Houser 
and Kurzban were a result of confusion.  In our design that follows, we also find that about 50% of the first round 
contributions were a result of error.  The estimates may differ because of the information about computer 
contributions that confused subjects had in round one of Houser and Kurzban’s design. 
 5
of interdependent utility and warm-glow altruism, and the strength of both motives does not 
decline over rounds. The authors conclude that (1) interdependent utility has no detectable effect 
on behavior and (2) warm-glow is present but small. The decay in contributions is, by 
assumption, attributed to reductions in confusion. 
Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) use an alternative VCM design in which group size is 
either two or four and the “internal” return of a subject’s contribution to the public good to the 
subject may differ from the “external” return of the same contribution to the other group member 
(n=32). The authors estimate a logit choice model of noisy decision-making based on data from a 
series of one-shot VCM games (no feedback) in which the internal and external returns are 
varied.  In contrast to Palfrey and Prisbrey, they conclude that interdependent utility motivates 
subject contributions rather than warm-glow altruism. They also find that errors (“noise”) play a 
role in explaining contributions. 
Carpenter (2004) moves beyond characterizing confusion as simply statistical noise and 
develops a theoretical model of herding (“imitation”) in the VCM game, which he describes as 
an attempt “to take advantage of the information acquired and processed by others” (p.396) by 
“copying the most observed behavior in a population” (p.395). Carpenter’s dynamic replicator 
model of imitation predicts that were subjects (n=165) to observe the individual contributions of 
their group members rather than the just the aggregate level of contributions, the decay of 
contributions would be more rapid because herders would have more information and that 
information would facilitate their move towards zero contributions. Carpenter’s experimental 
results confirm his theoretical prediction. 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2004) correctly point out that that previous experimental 
analyses do not allow for the presence of “conditional cooperators,” or, in our terms, strong 
reciprocators. In Fischbacher and Gächter’s “P-experiment”, they ask subjects to specify, for 
each average contribution level of the other group members, how much they would contribute to 
the public good. The experiment “has the purpose of directly eliciting subjects’ willingness for 
conditional cooperation.” By comparing the responses in this experiment with those in their C-
experiment, which is a standard VCM game with four-person groups (n=140), Fischbacher and 
Gächter argue that their results imply the vast majority of contributions are motivated by strong 
reciprocators. They find no evidence of interdependent utility or warm-glow altruism (no 
subjects stated they would contribute if other group members contributed zero). In contrast to 
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previous work, they claim confusion accounts for very few contributions to the public good (“at 
most 17.5 percent,” p.3). They also argue that the decay in contributions is largely a result of 
interaction among free riders and strong reciprocators who revoke their cooperation once they 
realize they are among people who are not “norm abiders.” 
The small role for confusion in explaining contributions and their decay seems at odds 
with previous research. We believe the problem lies in the way in which strong reciprocators are 
identified by Fischbacher and Gächter. A strong reciprocator is any subject who states in the P-
Experiment that he will contribute more if other group members contribute more. A confused, 
herding subject, however, would exhibit the same behavior. Thus the authors cannot discriminate 
between strong reciprocators and herders. Likewise, the authors claim that a positive correlation 
of contributions and beliefs about the contributions of others (elicited each round) is an 
indication of the presence of strong reciprocators, whereas it is also an indication of herders. 
Thus, the six papers reviewed above offer very different conclusions about the underlying 
motives that generate positive contributions to the public good.  Some argue that error is 
important and reductions in error lead to the decay in contributions over time. Others, however, 
argue that error is a small component of contributions and the decay stems from revocation of 
cooperation by conditional cooperators. The studies also come to different conclusions about the 
source and significance of other-regarding behavior. 
We believe these differing conclusions derive from experimental designs that often 
change the VCM game in fundamental ways that have unknown effects on subject behavior and 
from empirical strategies that differ in their ability to discriminate among the hypothesized 
motives (none allow for all of the hypothesized motives).  In the next section, we present an 
experimental design that addresses the aforementioned weaknesses in the current literature and 
attempts to resolve much of the conflicting claims about motives in VCM experiments. 
Before we move on to the next section, however, we wish to address the potential role of 
weak reciprocity in the VCM game. Much of the recent literature ignores this motive and we 
believe there is good reason to do so. Andreoni (1988) developed the “Strangers” treatment in 
which group members in a VCM game are randomly rematched every round, as opposed to the 
standard “Partners” treatment in which subjects stay in the same group over rounds. Since that 
publication, other authors have used the Partners-Strangers design in the standard VCM game or 
a variant of it.  A review of 15 of these experiments by Andreoni and Croson (2003) lists five 
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that find more cooperation among Strangers, six that find more among Partners, and four that fail 
to find a difference between the two treatments. 
If weak reciprocity were a strong motive for behavior in the VCM, one would expect 
cooperation to be consistently higher in the Partners treatment.  Under random rematching, weak 
reciprocity makes little sense. Andreoni and Croson conclude that weak reciprocity (“game 
theoretic effects”) is unlikely to influence play in the repeated-round VCM.5 In the analysis 
below, we assume that weak reciprocity is not an important determinant of VCM dynamics. 
 
III. Methodology 
We use the archetypal repeated-round, linear VCM game. Group size is four individuals 
who remain (anonymously) matched for a single treatment. Each subject is given an endowment 
of 50 laboratory tokens per round (US $0.50). The Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) – the 
marginal return from the public good to the individual relative to the value of a token kept – is 
constant and equal to 0.50, thus making free-riding the dominant strategy and contributing the 
entire endowment the socially optimal strategy. The payoff function for individual i is 
)(*5.050 iiii Yyy ++−=π         (1) 
where yi is i’s contribution to the public good and Yi is the contributions from the other members 
in i’s group. These attributes of the experiment are common knowledge.  Instructions (see 
Appendix) are presented both orally and in writing.  Subjects receive a payoff table that shows 
them the payoff from the public good (“group exchange”) for every possible amount of group 
contributions.  Every subject answers a series of practice questions that tests their understanding 
of payoff calculations. No subject can proceed until all the questions are answered correctly. The 
same author moderated all of the experiments. 
After each round, subjects receive information on their contribution, the aggregate 
contribution of the other group members, their payoff from the group exchange, and their payoff 
from their private exchange (private good). On the decision screen is a “Transaction History” 
button, through which subjects can, at any time, observe the outcomes from previous rounds of 
the experiment (see Appendix for an image of the Decision Screen). 
                                                 
5 The Strangers design of Fischbacher and Gächter also rules out the role of strategic considerations in motivating 
positive contributions in the VCM game, yet their contribution dynamics are quite typical (begin around 40% of 
endowment and decline to 10%). 
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In the “all-human” treatment, subjects play 25 rounds of the VCM game described in the 
first paragraph of this Section. Each subject knows that he or she will be playing 25 rounds with 
the same three players. To prevent individuals from discerning the identity of other group 
members, group assignment is random and five groups participate simultaneously in sessions of 
this treatment. In the “virtual-player” treatment, which is an extension of the single-shot design 
used by Ferraro et al. (2003), subjects play 25 rounds of the VCM game with only one important 
change: each human is paired with 3 virtual players (automata) and knows that he or she is 
grouped with virtual players.  Each virtual player plays a predetermined (i.e., exogenous) 
contribution profile. The contribution profile is the same profile produced by a human player in a 
previous all-human treatment. A computer essentially scours a database of observations of 
human contributions in a previous all-human session and then picks at random (without 
replacement) a set of three human subjects from a group as the “identity” of the three virtual 
players. The human subjects are aware of the how the virtual players’ decisions are determined.  
Thus each subject knows that he or she is part of a group of non-human players that behave 
exactly like real humans behaved in all-human groups in the same experiment. 
An important feature of this design is that each human in the all-human treatment has a 
human “twin” in the virtual-player treatment:  each twin sees exactly the same contributions by 
the other three members of his group in each round – the only difference is that the player in the 
virtual-player treatment knows he is playing with pre-programmed virtual players, not humans. 
Thus, for example, say subject H1 plays with H2, H3 and H4 in the all-human treatment session.  
Subject V1 in the virtual-player session plays with 3 virtual players, one of whom plays exactly 
like human subject H2, one of whom plays exactly like subject H3, and one of whom plays 
exactly like subject H4. This design ensures that we can treat the individual as the observational 
unit, rather than use the group as the independent unit of observation or make the assumption 
that the history of play has no effect on contributions. 
To ensure that subjects in the virtual-player treatment believe the virtual player 
contributions are truly pre-programmed and exogenous, each subject has a sealed envelope in 
front of her. The subjects are told that inside the envelope are the choices for each round from 
the virtual players in their groups. At the end of the experiment, they can open the envelope and 
verify that the history of virtual group member contributions that they observed during the 
experiment is indeed the same as in the envelope. The subjects are informed that the reason we 
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provide this envelope is to prove to them that there is no deception: the virtual players behave 
exactly as the moderator explained they do.6  
Each session consists of two experimental conditions, with 25 rounds of play in each. We 
designate the first 25-round period in a session as “I” (for “inexperienced”) and the second 25-
round period as “E” (“experienced”). At the beginning of each session, however, subjects are 
unaware that they would be playing an additional 25 rounds after the first 25 rounds. They 
simply begin with the instructions for the first 25 rounds. After the first 25 rounds are over, 
subjects are informed that there will be another 25 rounds.  
Overall, with both inexperienced and experienced subject groups playing in the “all-
human” (designated as “H”) and virtual-player (“V”) treatments, we have four experimental 
conditions that will be used to make inferences about the dynamics of subject behavior in the 
repeated-round VCM game: 
 
1) HI:  Twenty-five rounds with inexperienced, all-human groups. 
2) VI:  Twenty-five rounds with inexperienced, virtual-player groups. 
3) HE:  Twenty-five rounds with experienced, all-human groups. 
4) VE:  Twenty-five rounds with experienced, virtual-player groups. 
 
The HI condition is the standard linear VCM game about which we wish to draw inferences 
about the subjects’ motives. To do so, we contrast HI with VI, VE and HE.  Subjects in a VI 
(VE) treatment observed the same history of contributions as subjects in a corresponding HI 
(HE) condition:  each subject in HI (HE) has a “twin” in VI (VE).  The only difference between 
HI (HE) and VI (VE) is that the humans in VI (VE) were playing with virtual players.   
 Since HI data are used in the VI treatment and HE data used in the VE treatment, we 
necessarily ran a sequence of three experiments. HI, by definition, had to be run first. HI subjects 
played their last 25 rounds in a modified version in which virtual-agent contributions were taken 
                                                 
6 We asked two post-experiment “True or False” questions, for which our 320 subjects were paid for correctly 
answering: (1) The Virtual Players in your group were human beings who received money from your investment in 
the Group Exchange; and (2) You were able to affect how much the Virtual Players invested in the Group Exchange 
by changing your investment. Given the virtual-player behaviors were modeled on the behaviors of real humans, a 
subject might answer “True” to (1) if he misses the “your” before “investment.” Only 8 subjects answered True to 
(1) and 3 answered True to (2). Inferences from our analysis do not pivot on the inclusion/exclusion of the subjects 
who answered True to these statements. 
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from previous HI, rather than HE, players. These last 25 rounds are thus not used in any analysis.  
VI subjects participated in VI and then HE. Only after these sessions were complete could the 
VE sessions, in which subjects first saw the VI contribution profile followed by virtual-agent 
contributions taken from HE, take place (otherwise any differences among experienced subjects 
may be due to playing with virtual players or due to subjects seeing a different history of 
contributions). In sum, HI data come from one experiment, VI and HE data from a second, and 
VE data from a third experiment. 
Students from Georgia State University (Atlanta, Georgia) were recruited to participate in 
a computerized experiment conducted in the Georgia State University Experimental Laboratory. 
We have eighty subjects in each experimental condition. Subjects came from all majors and 
earned, on average, $33.14 for their performance in an experiment that lasted less than 1.5 hours.  
 
IV. Analysis of Aggregate Behavior 
The results of our experiments are summarized in Figure 1, which presents average 
contributions by round for each of the four experimental conditions. To facilitate comparisons, 
Table 1 presents nonparametric test statistics for selected pair-wise differences among our four 
conditions. For these between-subject tests we employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two 
independent samples (Sheskin 2000). These tests are preferred over standard t-tests because the 
distribution of contributions across subjects in a given round is very non-normal, with distinct 
focal points (e.g., spikes in the distribution at contributions levels of 25% and 50%) and many 
contributions of 0%. Statistical tests of equal contributions for selected pairs of experiment 
conditions are presented on a round-by-round basis as well as for the average subject-specific 
contributions across all rounds.  
An essential maintained assumption in our analysis is that any contributions in the 
virtual-player treatment stem from a failure to recognize the dominant strategy of zero 
contributions. It is plausible, perhaps, that non-monetary considerations may have caused 
subjects to contribute in this treatment. Subjects may have, for example, felt compelled to 
contribute due to altruism towards the experiment moderator or due to a desire not to appear too 
greedy (Houser and Kurzban 2002). We took great care in thwarting as well as identifying these 
types of behavior. First, the experimenter stated that the money to pay participants came from a 
research grant, rather than his own pocket. Second, financial incentives were made sufficiently 
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large in order to establish payoff dominance: the average subject that was confused throughout 
the treatment forewent over $4 in earnings. Third, in a post-experiment questionnaire, we asked 
what the payoff-maximizing level of contributions was in the virtual treatment. Subjects were 
paid for correct answers (see Appendix). A comparison of these stated contributions with actual 
contributions provides evidence of whether subjects were indeed attempting to maximize 
earnings rather than attempting to please the experimenter. Using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test, we fail to reject the hypothesis that stated and actual contributions are equal, 
using average contributions from the last five virtual-player rounds [z=0.51, p=0.61]. Overall, we 
feel confident that virtual-player contributions are largely due to confusion.7  
For clarity of exposition, we organize our aggregate experimental outcome into four main 
results. 
 
Result 1. Other-regarding preferences and confusion are significant motives that determine 
public good contributions in the standard VCM experiment (HI). Further, other-regarding 
behavior contributions decrease over rounds. 
  
We focus first on comparing all-human and virtual-player contributions rates with 
inexperienced subjects, as this represents the cleanest distinction between contributions 
stemming from other-regarding motives versus those due to confusion in the standard VCM 
game. Contributions to the public good in HI, which represents the standard VCM game where 
inexperienced subjects play with other human subjects over repeated rounds, start at 50.1% of 
endowment in round 1, and steadily decline to 14.1% by round 25. This parallels the standard 
finding in the literature of 40 to 60% contributions in the initial period followed by a steady 
decline (Davis and Holt, 1993).  
In comparison, VI contributions start at 25.6% and fall to 9.9% by round 25. On average, 
subjects contribute 32.5% and 19.7% of all endowments to the public good in the all-human and 
virtual-player treatments, respectively. Dividing VI contributions by HI contributions suggests 
                                                 
7 Other data also confirm that other-regarding behavior toward the experimenter is unlikely to be an important 
motive.  In sessions in which subjects played all 50 rounds with Virtual Players (n=80), we added two questions to 
the post-experiment questionnaire:  “Circle the number on the rating scale that best represents your opinion about 
the decisions you made in the experiment. (A) I wanted to make as much money as I could for myself;  (B) I wanted 
to make sure the professor running the experiment did not lose a lot of money.” For each statement, subjects circled 
a number ranging from 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important).  The mean response to A was 6.0 and to B was 1.2 
(only 11 subjects circled a number greater than “1” – 8 of them circled “2”). 
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that 60.6% of the total contributions in the standard VCM game stem from confusion; the 
remaining 39.4% are attributable to other-regarding behavior. Statistical tests indicate that public 
good contributions are statistically higher in the all-human treatment at the 5% level both on 
average and in 24 of 25 rounds, such that other-regarding behavior is generally a statistically 
significant determinant. 
 In their closely related study, Houser and Kurzban (2002) find that, on average, 54% of 
the total contributions in their all-human treatment are attributable to confusion. Focusing on our 
first ten rounds, the length of the Houser and Kurzban experiment, our figure is 58%. These 
summary statistics are quite close. However, note that Houser and Kurzban find that the rate of 
contributions decline in the all-human treatment is statistically slower than the virtual-player 
treatment. This suggests that a larger fraction of the observed contributions is attributable to 
other-regarding preferences as the experiment progresses (and less is due to confusion). 
Specifically, they find that 26% of total contributions in round 1 stems from other-regarding 
preferences versus 73% in round 10. In contrast, our rate of decline is statistically different and 
faster for the all-human treatment (about a two-fold difference) suggesting that other-regarding 
behavior declines over rounds. 8 In particular, other-regarding preferences account for 49% and 
48% of total contributions in rounds 1 and 10, respectively. This figure declines as our 
experiment progresses, with 30% of contributions due to other-regarding motives in round 25. 
To put this into a different perspective, we subtract virtual-player contributions from all-
human contributions and find that subjects give 24% of their endowment because of other-
regarding preferences in round 1 and only give 4% of their endowment because of other-
regarding preferences in round 25. The divergence in the pattern and magnitude of other-
regarding preferences between our experiment and that of Houser and Kurzban may be 
attributable to differences in the two subject pools or due to the procedural variances in the 
Houser and Kurzban experimental design we highlighted previously.  
  
Result 2. Result 1 is robust to experience.  
                                                 
8 We regress mean contributions (%) on a constant and an indicator variable for the experiment round. To facilitate 
hypothesis tests, this is done within a time-series cross-section modeling framework (see Greene 2003, p. 320-333) 
whereby each treatment is a cross-sectional unit observed over a 25 period time horizon. This framework allows for 
treatment-specific heteroscedasticity, first-order autocorrelation, and correlation across units. The estimated 
relationships for the HI and VI conditions are: [HI] contributions = 49.05 – 1.27*round; [VI] contributions = 28.04 – 
0.64*round. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of equal slope coefficients for two experiment conditions 
[χ2(1)=29.00, p<0.01].  
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  Although experienced subjects in the all-human treatment contribute less than 
inexperienced subjects (HI vs. HE), a finding consistent with the literature (Davis and Holt 
1993), the general relationships observed between virtual-player and all-human treatments with 
inexperienced subjects are robust to experience (HE vs. VE). That is, there is statistical evidence 
that contributions stemming from other-regarding behavior are significant and are decreasing 
over rounds. In particular, other-regarding preferences account for 51%, 47%, and 25% of total 
contributions in rounds 1, 10, and 25, respectively. The rate of decline is approximately 1.6 times 
faster for the all-human treatment.9
 
Result 3. Contribution rates are similar across inexperienced and experienced subjects in the 
virtual-player treatment. 
 
 A standing hypothesis in the literature is that much of the contributions decay in the 
repeated-round VCM is attributable to subjects becoming aware of (i.e., “learning”) the 
dominant strategy of zero contributions (Andreoni 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997; Houser and 
Kurzban 2002). The virtual-player sessions allow us to test this hypothesis because learning in 
this treatment is not confounded by other-regarding behavior, which may also lead to decreasing 
contributions in VCM games (our Results 1 and 2).  Therefore, our prior expectation is that 
virtual-player contributions from inexperienced subjects (i.e., VI) would be significantly higher 
than subjects with prior VCM experience (i.e., VE). The data do not support this expectation. 
Average contributions are 19.7% and 11.9% of endowment with inexperienced and experienced 
subjects, respectively. These averages are not statistically different at the 5% level. 
Inexperienced subject contributions are only statistically higher than experienced subject 
contributions in the first three rounds and in round 22. While this pattern suggests that a few 
inexperienced subjects may have indeed (quickly) learned the dominant strategy, overall learning 
effects appear to be minimal. An alternative explanation for the decay in virtual-player 
contributions is that confused subjects are simply herding on the observed downward trend in 
virtual player contributions (which reflect behavior in past all-human sessions). 
                                                 
9 Using the framework outlined in footnote 8, the estimated relationships for the HE and VE conditions are: [HE] 
contributions = 31.02 – 0.78*round; [VE] contributions = 18.16 – 0.48*round. A likelihood ratio test rejects the 
hypothesis of equal slope coefficients for these experiment conditions [χ2(1)=3.88, p<0.05].  
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Result 4. Little warm-glow or inter-dependent utility is evident in the all-human treatment.   
 
 Finally, given the standard assumption that warm-glow and interdependent utility do not 
decay over rounds, we can use the difference between all-human and virtual-player contributions 
in the last round as an upper bound on warm-glow/interdependent utility contributions. For 
inexperienced subjects, we have that the average subject contributes 4.2% of their endowment 
due to warm-glow and interdependent utility considerations. For experienced subjects, this figure 
is 2.3%. Putting this into another perspective, just 13.0% and 11.0% of observed contributions 
could be attributed to warm-glow and interdependent utility for inexperienced and experienced 
subjects, respectively. 
 
V. Behavioral Model and Econometric Analysis of Individual Behavior 
Behavioral Model 
 In this section, we develop a dynamic model of individual behavior for VCM 
experiments that encompasses the popular motives for public good contributions discussed in the 
literature. We then use econometric methods to estimate the unknown parameters of the model in 
order to gain insight on the relative importance of the behavioral motives under the different 
design conditions. 
 As a starting point, consider the behavior of subjects in our virtual-player treatment that 
do not initially deduce that their dominant strategy is to give zero contributions (and that any 
deviation from this behavior necessarily results in lost earnings).  These “confused” individuals 
may look to financial signals (reinforcement learning) or to the contributions from others 
(herding) as indicators of optimal behavior.  To incorporate these motives, we adopt a partial 
adjustment framework (Mason and Phillips 1997; Cason and Friedman 1999), which theorizes 
that the subject’s decision in the current period is based on her assessment of her departure from 
the optimal decision in previous periods. Turning first to reinforcement learners, we depict these 
subjects as engaging in a hill-climbing exercise whereby their objective is to search for the 
profit-maximizing strategy based on financial signals from previous rounds.  Let yit denote 
individual i’s contribution to the public good in round t. Further, let πit denote earnings and Di,t-1 
be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the subject increases contributions from round t-2 to t-1, 
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equals –1 if contributions decrease between rounds t-2 and t-1, and equals 0 when contributions 
are unchanged. Then, a reasonable approximation is:10
 
 yit = β1RLyi,t-1 + β2RLyi,t-2 + γRL[Di,t-1(πi,t-1 – πi,t-2)]      (2) 
 
Inspection of this expression reveals that the reinforcement learning or “profit feedback” 
mechanism directs the hill climber to continue to increase (decrease) contributions if they 
increased (decreased) last period and earned more money or directs her to adjust contributions in 
the opposite direction when their last adjustment yielded lower earnings. No profit feedback is 
provided when contributions or profits do not change between rounds t-2 and t-1. Thus, we 
expect γRL > 0. We also expect γRL will be smaller in the experienced sessions, as reinforcement 
learning should have dissipated by then. Since current and lagged contributions should be 
positively correlated: β1RL, β2RL > 0.  
Our model of herding behavior assumes that the player adjusts her contributions based on 
the difference between her contribution last period and the average contribution of the other 
group members: 
 
 yit = αHerd + β1Herdyi,t-1 + β2Herdyi,t-2 + λHerd( yi,t-1 -Yi,t-1/n)     (3) 
 
For the herder, a negative (positive) deviation is a signal that she is contributing less (more) than 
average and should thus increase contributions. Hence, the expectation is λHerd < 0.  The constant 
term, αH, represents a baseline level of contributions the player deems optimal. It is plausible, for 
instance, that the player posits that she should give something, even if the virtual-players give 
nothing. As contributions can only be positive, expectation is αHerd > 0. Melding (2) and (3) 
yields our model of virtual-player treatment behavior 
 
 yit = αHerd + β1Vyi,t-1 + β2Vyi,t-2 + λHerd(yi,t-1 -Yi,t-1/n) + γRL[Di,t-1(πi,t-1 – πi,t-2)] + εitV  (4) 
 
                                                 
10 While we include one and two-period lags of the dependent variable in our theoretical specifications, the 
appropriate number of lags to include (i.e., how backward-looking subjects are) is more of an empirical issue. See 
discussion below in the Econometric Analysis subsection. 
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where βjV is a weighted average of βjRL and βjHerd (for j = 1, 2), and εitV is a mean-zero error term 
that captures the analyst’s uncertainty about the specification of individual behavior. 
 Turning to other-regarding behavior, we consider three such motives: warm-glow, inter-
dependent utility, and strong reciprocity, as defined previously. The standard assumption that 
warm-glow and altruism do not diminish over time (e.g., Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997) suggests the 
level of contributions due to either motive does not contribute to any of the observed dynamics in 
contributions behavior: the model of warm-glow or interdependent utility is depicted by the 
relationship between contributions and a constant term. Thus, 
 
yit = αWG + αIU          (5) 
  
where αWG and αIU are specific warm-glow and interdependent utility constants, respectively.  
A strong reciprocator should behave in a similar manner to a herder: she increases her 
contribution if the average group member is contributing more than her, and decreases 
contributions when she perceives she is giving too much relative to others. Thus our model of 
strong reciprocators is: 
 
 yit = αSR + β1SRyi,t-1 + β2SRyi,t-2 + λSR(yi,t-1 -Yi,t-1/n)       (6)  
 
with expectations αSR > 0, βSR > 0, and λSR < 0. An important point of emphasis is that while 
strong reciprocator and herder behavior may look the same, the motivation for the behavior is 
different.  For the herding subject, the average contribution from others is a signal of how the 
subject should behave; for the strong reciprocator, the average contribution of the others is a 
signal of whether the other players are norm-abiders or they are taking advantage of the subject. 
Putting these other-regarding motives together yields a model of other-regarding behavior: 
 
 yit = αORP + β1SRyi,t-1 + β2SRyi,t-2 + λSR(yi,t-1 -Yi,t-1/n) + εitORP    (7)  
 
where εitORP is a mean zero disturbance term; we set αORP ≡  αWG + αIU + αSR since our 
experimental design does not allow us to separately identify these constant terms. Combining 
equations (4) and (7) we obtain our behavioral model for the all-human treatment:   
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 yit = αH + β1Hyi,t-1 + βH2yi,t-2 + λH( yi,t-1 -Yi,t-1/n) + γRL[Di,t-1(πi,t-1 – πi,t-2)] + εitH (8) 
where βjH is a weighted average of βjSR and βjV; λH is a weighted average of λV and λSR, and αH = 
αHerd + αORP. Contributions data from the all-human treatment alone do not allow one to identify 
the parameters αHerd and αORP separately. However, estimates of these parameters are recoverable 
by estimating the unknown parameters of (8) and (4) with comparable all-human and virtual-
player data, respectively. Since the difference between λH and λC is not equal to λORP – the 
proportions of strong reciprocators and herders in the sample are not explicitly known – we 
cannot recover an estimate of λORP by comparing parameter estimating from comparable all-
human and virtual-player treatment data. However, larger estimates of λ with all-human 
treatment data indicate that strong reciprocator behavior is significant. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
In estimating the parameters of our behavioral model, it is important to account for the 
characteristics of our dependent variable as well as the panel structure of our data. Contributions 
data are discrete with a preponderance of zeros and small values. As typical in empirical work 
when many observations take zero values, recent efforts use Tobit models to analyze VCM data 
(Ashley, Ball and Eckel, 2003; Carpenter, 2004). An essential assumption of the Tobit is that 
zero values for the dependent variable theoretically indicate possible negative values, but these 
negative values are unobserved due to censoring at zero.  However, this assumption is at odds 
with contributions data, as contributions, in principal, cannot assume negative values and zero 
values are not due to nonobservability. We instead appropriately treat our contributions data as 
count data and assume that the data follow a Poisson distribution. The standard Poisson 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is still a consistent estimator of the unknown model 
parameters when applied to panel data (unlike the Tobit), although the standard covariance 
estimator is biased in this situation. To make valid inferences, we couple the Poisson MLE with 
White’s (1982) robust covariance estimator, a.k.a. the “sandwich” estimator. We use a particular 
formulation of the covariance estimator for “clustered” data, which arbitrarily allows for 
correlation among observations from the same individual (i.e., is robust to unobserved, 
individual heterogeneity) and is robust to a variety of common model misspecifications (e.g., 
over-dispersion) (see Greene 2003). The advantage of using the Poisson MLE with a panel-
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corrected covariance estimator is that one can avoid estimating a fixed or random effects model, 
which entails adding possibly nocuous structure to the estimator. Indeed, in employing the 
standard random effects MLE, the analyst assumes that the random effect is additive, 
uncorrelated with included regressors, and normally distributed. If, for example, the assumed 
distribution is incorrect, this estimator is inconsistent. 
Although our behavioral model includes one and two-period lags of the dependent 
variable as explanatory factors, the number of lags to include (i.e., how backwards looking 
subjects are) is largely an empirical question. Our results are robust to alternative (i.e., higher 
and lower-order) specifications, and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) favors the present 
specification.11 Table 2 presents estimated Poisson models corresponding to each experimental 
condition. Given the lagged variables included as explanatory variables in equations (4) and (8), 
we omit the observations from the first two rounds in each sample. We organize our econometric 
outcome into two main findings. 
 
Result 5. The majority of the decline in contributions in the virtual-player treatment with 
inexperienced or experienced subjects arises from herding behavior. As such, there is little 
evidence that subjects learn the dominant strategy of zero contributions. 
 
All parameters of the estimated models have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, with the exception of the parameter on the profit feedback variable, 
which is only significant for inexperienced subjects. The lack of statistical significant on the 
feedback variable with experienced subjects is consistent with our expectation that most of the 
“hill-climbing” or “reinforcement learning” would dissipate over repeated rounds. In the interest 
of determining whether there is a cut-off point during the experiment where the average 
reinforcement learning that takes place becomes negligible, we generalized our virtual-player 
model for inexperienced subjects in Table 2 by allowing a structural break with respect to the 
feedback variable. This investigation yields an interesting result: we can reject the hypothesis 
that contributions due to reinforcement learning are statistically different from zero in periods 9-
                                                 
11 We estimated models (available upon request) using only a one-period lag as well as models that included up to 
five-period lags.  Inferences drawn from these alternative specifications are similar to those presented in this paper. 
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25 (we can reject this hypothesis for the all-human treatment as well). Thus, it appears that the 
main driving force behind the decay in virtual-player contributions is herding behavior.  
 An investigation of the raw data reveals that the number of free riders ($0 contribution) in 
Round 1, Round 2, Round 24 and Round 25 of VI is 22, 27, 49 and 50; the corresponding 
numbers in VE are 38, 31, 46 and 58. Additional supporting evidence for Result 4 can be found 
in our post-experiment question about the profit-maximizing contributions level in the virtual-
player treatment. Thirty percent of the subjects answered with a number greater than zero (mean 
= 28 tokens; median = 25 tokens).12  Thus after 50 rounds, a substantial proportion of the 
subjects had not deciphered the dominant strategy.  Given many subjects herded to zero 
contributions by Round 50, this proportion represents a lower bound on the number of confused 
subjects in HI – our focus group results (next section) suggest the proportion is much higher. 
 
Result 6. Strong reciprocity (conditional cooperation) is a significant motive for contributions in 
the all-human treatment. 
 
For both experienced and inexperienced subjects, the estimate of λ is statistically larger 
(in absolute value) in the all-human treatment than in the corresponding virtual-player treatment 
at the 5% significance level [inexperienced: z=1.76, p=0.04; experienced: z=2.15, p=0.02]. Thus, 
λH > λHerd, and so strong reciprocity is a significant motive for contributions in the all-human 
conditions. 
 
VI. Discussion 
Our analysis clearly demonstrates the substantial effects of herding and strong reciprocity 
on the dynamics of VCM game experiments.  Thus history matters: contributions of group 
members in period t-1 influence individual contributions in period t.  Herders look to history for 
a signal on how they should behave in a confusing situation.  Strong reciprocators look to history 
to infer whether they are playing with “norm abiders” and thus whether they should continue to 
cooperate or begin to revoke their cooperation.  Thus, analysts who model individual behavior in 
public goods experiments must appropriately account for the dynamics associated with repeated 
                                                 
12 We did not ask this question in the first three sessions (n=60). We added the question only after being surprised by 
how many individuals were contributing in the last round of the virtual-player treatment. 
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group interactions in order to make valid inferences. Further, given the small samples used in 
many repeated-round experiments, simple difference of means tests between treatment and 
control groups can be confounded if the composition (e.g., the number of free-riders and 
confused individuals) of control and treatment groups differ systematically. The treatment of 
individuals as independent observations without controlling for group history may be one reason 
for conflicting experimental results in the literature. 
Turning to the oft-observed decay in contributions over rounds, our analysis strongly 
points to interactions among free riders, strong reciprocators and herders as the main drivers of 
the decay.  The fact that average contributions in (theoretically straight-forward) linear public 
goods games start between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment is consistent with the hypothesis 
that some participants are free riders, some are strong reciprocators, and some are initially 
uncertain about what to do.  Ledyard (1995, p.146) conjectures that many of these uncertain 
subjects might simply split their endowment approximately half-half to see what happens.  Our 
first-round data support his conjecture: in HI, 31 subjects chose a contribution between 20 and 30 
tokens and in VI, 29 subjects chose a contribution between 20 and 30 tokens. Note that in HI, 11 
subjects contributed their entire endowment, while none did in the VI, suggesting that most of 
the full-endowment contributors are not confused. 
In the absence of punishment opportunities, the co-existence of free riders, strong 
reciprocators and herders leads to substantial decline in contributions to the public good.  The 
initial contribution behavior, rather than the payoff outcome, starts a cascade of declining 
contributions through the revocation of cooperation by disappointed strong reciprocators and the 
herding on the downward trend by confused players.  The presence of more than one herder in a 
group, however, may prevent universal free-riding from ever arising. 
Our results imply that much of the contributions observed in VCM experiments come 
from confused individuals who never recognize the tension between the privately optimal 
strategy of free riding and the socially-beneficial strategy of contributing. We claim that at least 
50% of observed contributions come from such subjects and at least 30% of subjects fall into this 
category. The latter estimate is based on the post-experiment question on the payoff-maximizing 
contribution, as well as the number of subjects free-riding at the end of 50 rounds of play with 
virtual players (VE). If we based our estimate on the 10th round free-riding behavior of VI 
subjects, the estimated proportion of confused subjects rises to 55%. If we use 3rd round 
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behavior, the proportion rises to 61%. Recall that we gave subjects standard VCM instructions 
with examples (in writing and orally), an oral summary of main features of the experiment, 
practice questions that had to be answered correctly before play began, and a payoff table (as 
well as the ability to observe the entire history of subject and group contributions). 
 An alternative way to categorize subjects is to examine play in rounds 10-19 in HI and VI 
(after hill-climbing has been abandoned). Subjects who consistently contribute at or near zero in 
HI provide an estimate of the percentage of subjects who are free riders (19%). Dividing the 
number of consistently positive contributors in VI by the number of such contributors in HI 
provides an estimate of the percentage of HI positive contributors who are confused (66%), 
which implies an estimate of the percentage of subjects who are confused (53%). The rest are 
strong reciprocators (28%).13 For comparison, Fischbacher and Gächter estimate that 23% of 
their sample are free riders, 55% are strong reciprocators and 22% are “other.” 
Is it really possible that so many subjects are oblivious to the dilemma experimentalists 
are attempting to induce in the laboratory? To explore the question further, we paid subjects in 
our last session (n=20) an additional $10 to remain in the laboratory and serve as a focus group 
to provide feedback to the experimenters. These subjects had just completed playing 50 rounds 
with virtual players. Two-thirds (67.5%) of the subjects correctly answered “0” to the post-
experiment question about the payoff-maximizing Group Exchange contribution. As we will see, 
however, many of them guessed at this answer based on the final-round behaviors of virtual 
players or interpreted the question as asking for the “risk-free” contribution level. 
Subjects first provided written answers to six questions (see Appendix) that probed their 
thoughts about the experiment. Of particular interest are the answers to the question, “How did 
you determine how many tokens to invest in the Group Exchange in the early rounds of the 
experiment (first 10 rounds).”  Subjects were given the following choices: (A) The choice was 
clear from the instructions; (B) I invested different amounts and watched how my payoff 
changed; (C) I observed how many tokens the Virtual Players invested and altered my decision 
accordingly; (D) Other (please specify).  Subjects were instructed they could choose more than 
one response.  Only 30% of subjects answered A.  Fifty-five percent answered B and 65% 
answered C (only one subject chose D). A typical written response by a subject who contributed 
to the public good was, “More money could be made in the group investment versus not 
                                                 
13 Using rounds 1-10, the estimates are: 10% free-riders, 66% confused and 24% strong reciprocators. 
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investing at all. In the previous rounds, the virtual players were on a gradual increase in investing 
in the group. So I wanted to get more money.” 
After the questionnaire was completed, the moderator asked each subject for more detail 
on how he or she made decisions in the “early” rounds (first 10 rounds) of the experiment. The 
order in which subjects were questioned was determined by the monitor’s observations of the 
data from rounds 6 – 20. The order was based loosely on how confused the subjects appeared to 
the moderator, which was determined by their contribution patterns. Subjects who persisted in 
making positive contributions or frequently changed their contribution levels were considered 
more confused and subjects who generally contributed zero were labeled least confused. We 
ordered subjects in this way to mitigate the risk that confused subject responses would be 
affected by the responses of subjects who understood the incentives. 
Only 25% of the subjects said that the payoff-maximizing strategy was clear from the 
instructions (some contributed a few tokens now and then just to confirm their understanding of 
the game). Ten percent of subjects reported having no idea about what was going on and simply 
chose contribution levels at random. Another 10% attempted, without success, to vary their 
contributions and infer a pattern. Twenty percent reported depending solely on the behavior of 
the virtual players to determine their own contribution. 
Thirty-five percent of the subjects reported a mix of beginning with a split of their 
endowment, followed by watching what the virtual players were doing and by attempting to infer 
if there was any pattern to earnings, followed quickly by abandoning any attempt to infer a 
pattern and instead herding along with the virtual players. Only one of these subjects reported 
finally “getting it” and changing his behavior for the second set of 25 rounds. Thus, as implied 
by our econometric results, some subjects attempted to infer the best response strategy from play 
of the game, but found it too difficult, gave up and simply imitated what they saw other players 
doing.  In retrospect, this result is not surprising. If a subject was unable to see from the 
instructions that every token invested in the Group Exchange yielded him only one-half token, 
the same subject is unlikely to make the inference from observing changes in earnings when his 
contributions and those of his group members were changing simultaneously. 
Recall that two-thirds of the subjects answered that contributing zero tokens to the Group 
Exchange would maximize their payoffs. When asked why they wrote down zero, but did not 
invest zero, two general responses were heard:  (1) one had to come up with an answer and given 
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the virtual players were contributing at zero or near zero in the final rounds, an answer of “0” 
seemed like the best answer; and (2) the question was asking about the “risk-free” investment 
decision. This latter response was common, orally and in writing, among self-reported herders. 
When probed, many subjects spoke of a perceived “risk” associated with investing in the Group 
Exchange. As the following two written answers imply, many subjects understood that higher 
group payoffs were engendered when all members contributed, but they mistakenly thought that 
this outcome maximized their own earnings. 
“If I wanted to play it safe, I would invest nothing at all.  But in order to maximize my 
earnings, every member (including virtual players) would need to invest.” 
“Put 50 in Individual and 0 in Group.   This would mean your money is guaranteed.  The 
other option is risky.” 
The oral discussion suggests there are two types of herders:  (1) the majority of herders 
who are confused and just follow average contributions of group; and (2) others who have a 
more sophisticated, but incomplete, understanding of the game in which they are playing. They 
incorrectly believe that it is privately optimal to contribute more when others are contributing 
more, and contribute less when others are contributing less. They have a sense of being 
“suckers” if they contribute and their group members do not, but they do not understand, even 
after 50 rounds of play with virtual players, that they would be better off by free-riding on the 
other group members’ contributions.  These players seem to view the game as an assurance 
game, rather than a linear public goods game. 
The oral response of one subject captures the sentiment of this sub-group: “The way to 
maximize your earnings was to invest when the Virtual Players invested and don’t invest when 
they didn’t invest. I would have made a lot more money if I had been with other Virtual Players. 
The ones I had in the second 25 periods were jerks. In the first 25, the virtuals invested a lot 
more in the Group Exchange than the ones I had in the last 25 rounds.  I hardly invested anything 
in the Group Exchange with the last group.”  The moderator asked her, “So if your Virtual 
Players had invested 50 tokens every period, you would also have invested 50 tokens?”  She 
said, “Yes, that would have ensured I made the most money.”  She then pointed to her payoff 
table and stated that more money was made when more tokens were invested.  Note that this 
woman (1) understood she was playing with robots whose behavior she could not change, (2) 
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correctly answered the post-experiment question on the payoff-maximizing contribution and (3) 
had just listened to another subject articulate the dominant strategy in precise terms. 
Thus the empirical results and the ex post subject narratives (transcripts available upon 
request) all suggest that a substantial proportion of subjects begin and end the experiment 
without recognizing the tension between the privately optimal strategy of free-riding and the 
socially-beneficial strategy of contributing to the public good. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Understanding behavior in experimental implementations of the Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism game is environmental economists with institutional and policy-oriented interests.  
We argue that the dynamics typically observed in VCM experiments are a result of interactions 
among free riders, strong reciprocators and confused herders. Contrary to widely held beliefs, we 
find little evidence that subjects who initially are unable deduce the dominant strategy of zero 
public good contributions ever “learn” this strategy through repeated play. These results have 
important implications for theoretical and empirical research and for the external validity of 
VCM experiments. 
What are the implications of strong reciprocity for theoretical and empirical research?  
The existence of strong reciprocators implies more complicated interactions among agents than 
have previously been assumed in public goods games. Beliefs and history are key determinants 
to the behavior of strong reciprocators. Ignoring such factors will lead to erroneous theoretical 
predictions and misplaced inferences based on empirical data. A better understanding of the 
behavior of strong reciprocators is an important area for future research. 
The existence of strong reciprocators also has environmental policy implications. The 
effects of a policy may be different if many people are strong reciprocators rather than impure or 
pure altruists.  For example, common knowledge of extensive free-riding in the provision of an 
environmental good (e.g., ignoring water restrictions, tampering with pollution control devices) 
can be disastrous for a society populated with strong reciprocators (and herders).  Likewise, 
common knowledge of extensive environmental compliance may result in the perseverance of 
high levels of compliance over time.  Such knowledge, however, would not have any effect on 
behavior if those who contribute to supplying environmental goods were motivated by pure or 
impure altruism.   
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This dependence on group dynamics may be one reason that conservation education 
rarely seems to have long-term effects on conservation outcomes.   Although such education can 
provide a social norm around which individuals can cooperate, free-riding by even a minority 
can eventually lead to a collapse of cooperation by those who believe the social norm is 
worthwhile. Moreover, the common practice of environmental awareness campaigns to 
emphasize how many citizens are free-riders only encourages more free-riding from strong 
reciprocators (and herders). A more appropriate strategy would be to emphasize the average 
contributions from contributors and not announce the frequency of free riders. 
What are the implications of herding behavior for theoretical and empirical research?  
Clearly, such behavior implies a specific structure on individual decision-making errors and this 
structure can be incorporated into theoretical and empirical models. More difficult to discern, 
however, is what such error implies about the ability of experimental economists to make 
predictions about behavior in non-experimental settings. For instance, in naturally-occurring 
public goods situations, people may not know how much to contribute to a public good and will 
look to neighbors or others for guidance. However, we believe that individuals in such situations 
do recognize the tension between the privately optimal strategy of free riding and the socially-
beneficial strategy of contributing some positive amount. They look to others for a signal of a 
value of the public good. Herding in public good experiments may thus be fundamentally 
different from herding in naturally-occurring public goods situations. Herding in public good 
experiments may be a result of the opaque, “neutral” language of experimental instructions, 
rather than a relevant empirical phenomenon for economists. 
 The presence of herders may thus pose a problem for those who wish to use public good 
experiments to make predictions about human behavior in environmental contexts. Laury and 
Taylor (2004) use behavior in a one-shot VCM game experiment to predict behavior in a 
situation in which individuals can contribute to a naturally-occurring environmental public good 
(urban tree planting). Using the empirical approach of Goeree, Holt and Laury to estimate an 
altruism (interdependent utility) parameter for each subject, the authors find little or no 
relationship between subjects’ altruism parameters and subjects’ behaviors in the naturally-
occurring public good situation. Such a result could arise if herding behavior mimics the 
behavior of altruists in their VCM experiment:  for example, the variations in MPCR used to 
identify altruistic motivations could also serve as external signals of appropriate behavior for 
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herders.  Their confusion, however, would not be incorporated into the Logit equilibrium 
model’s noise parameter, but rather the altruism parameter.14
In addition to shedding much needed light on what is going on in VCM experiments, our 
analysis contributes to the growing body of evidence that suggests there are different “types” of 
economic agents and the interaction of these agents gives rise to the observed dynamics of 
behavior and economic outcomes in our world.  More collaboration by theorists and 
experimentalists to understand agent types and model their interactions would be extremely 
fruitful in helping economists explain how humans, rather than hyper-rational automata, behave 
in the games in which they play. 
                                                 
14 We have preliminary data in which we replicated the Goeree, Holt and Laury experiment with all-human groups 
and human-virtual player groups.  Our data are consistent with the idea that the altruism coefficients estimates result 
from error, not altruism. 
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Table 1. Nonparametric, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Difference Tests1, 2 
Round HI v. VI HE v. VE HI v. HE VI v. VE 
1 0.3125** 0.3000** 0.2625** 0.2500** 
2 0.3250** 0.2000* 0.3750** 0.2125* 
3 0.2750** 0.1250 0.3250** 0.2000* 
4 0.2750** 0.1000 0.3750** 0.1625 
5 0.2750** 0.1250 0.3250** 0.1625 
6 0.3375** 0.2000* 0.2375* 0.1250 
7 0.3500** 0.2500** 0.3000** 0.1625 
8 0.3250** 0.0625 0.3375** 0.1125 
9 0.3875** 0.1125 0.3875** 0.1125 
10 0.3625** 0.2000* 0.3250** 0.1500 
11 0.3500** 0.2250* 0.2125* 0.1250 
12 0.3875** 0.2875** 0.2125* 0.1375 
13 0.2500** 0.2000* 0.2125* 0.1375 
14 0.3250** 0.2000* 0.1875 0.1125 
15 0.3250** 0.1750 0.1875 0.0625 
16 0.3125** 0.2000* 0.2125* 0.1750 
17 0.3250** 0.2750** 0.2250* 0.1500 
18 0.2750** 0.2125* 0.1375 0.1125 
19 0.3250** 0.2000* 0.2125* 0.0625 
20 0.1875 0.2375* 0.1250 0.1625 
21 0.3125** 0.1375 0.2875** 0.1125 
22 0.2750** 0.1250 0.2875** 0.2000* 
23 0.3500** 0.1000 0.3375** 0.1375 
24 0.2000* 0.1000 0.1500 0.0500 
25 0.2000* 0.0500 0.2625** 0.1250 
Average 0.4125** 0.2500** 0.3375** 0.1750 
* and **  correspond respectively to 5%, and 1% significance levels (one-sided tests). 
1 “H” and “V” refer to the All-Human and Virtual-Player treatments, respectively. “I ” and “E ” refer to 
inexperienced and experienced subjects, respectively.  
2 Critical values for one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistics are: 5% = 0.1929; 1% = 0.2403. 
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Table 2. Dynamic Poisson Models of Individual Behavior 
Dependent variable is yit (i’s contribution to the public good in round t) 
 
Variable 
 
Parameter 
All-Human, 
inexperienced 
Virtual-
Player, 
inexperienced 
All-Human, 
experienced 
Virtual-
Player, 
experienced 
Intercept α 1.8516 
(0.0738)** 
 
1.2482 
(0.1353)** 
1.3803 
(0.1001)** 
0.9379 
(0.1235)** 
yi,t-1
[subject contributions 
in round t-1] 
 
β1 0.0337 
(0.0028)** 
 
0.0376 
(0.0047)** 
0.0497 
(0.0037)** 
0.0462 
(0.0059)** 
yi,t-2
[subject contributions 
in round t-2] 
 
β2 0.0141 
(0.0016)** 
0.0298 
(0.0034)** 
0.0150 
(0.0024)** 
0.0353 
(0.0038)** 
yi,t-1 –(Yi,t-1/n)
[deviation from 
average contributions 
of other group 
members in round t-1] 
 
 
λ 
 
-0.0153 
(0.0023)** 
 
 
-0.0072 
(0.0040)* 
 
-0.0256 
(0.0035)** 
 
-0.0143 
(0.0039)** 
Di,t-1( πi,t-1 – πi,t-2) 
[profit “feedback” 
mechanism] 
 
γ 0.0044 
(0.0018)** 
 
0.0062 
(0.0033)* 
-0.0003 
(0.0037) 
0.0039 
(0.0045) 
Log-Likelihood  -13,751.38 
 
-12,538.29 -13,530.07 -10,134.32 
N  1840 
 
1840 1840 1840 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. 
* and ** indicate that parameters are statistically different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Consistent with our theoretical hypotheses, these are one-sided tests. 
 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Round
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
E
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t
HI: All-Human treatment, inexperienced subjects VI: Virtual-Player treatment, inexperienced subjects
HE: All-Human treatment, experienced subjects VE: Virtual-Player treatment, experienced subjects
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